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Abstract
Information-centric networks have distinct advantages with regard to securing sensitive
content as a result of their new approaches to managing data in potential future internet
architectures. These kinds of systems, because of their data-centric perspective, provide
the opportunity to embed policy-centric content management components that can address
looming problems in information distribution that both companies and federal agencies are
beginning to face with respect to sensitive content. This information-centricity facilitates
the application of security techniques that are very difficult and in some cases impossible to
apply in traditional packetized networks. This work addresses the current state of the art in
both these kinds of cross-domain systems and information-centric networking in general.
It then covers other related work, outlining why information-centric networks are more
powerful than traditional packetized networks with regard to usage management. Then,
it introduces a taxonomy of types of policy-centric usage managed information network
systems and an associated methodology for evaluating the individual taxonomic elements.
vi
It finally delves into experimental evaluation of the various defined architectural options
and presents results of comparing experimental evaluation with anticipated outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Current enterprise computing systems are facing a troubling future. As things stand today,
they are too expensive, unreliable, and information dissemination procedures are just too
slow. Current approaches to partitioning information in cross-domain scenarios are simply
unable to migrate to cloud environments because of reliance on control of physical hardware
to enforce information separation. The current approach of controlling information by
controlling the underlying physical network, the traditional approach to securing infor-
mation, does not scale into shared datacenters [56]. This leaves large government and
commercial organizations concerned with avoiding the exposure of sensitive data in a very
uncomfortable position, where they cannot continue doing what they have done, and cannot
migrate to what everyone else is doing.
Generally, systems handling sensitive information still do not use current commercial
resources as well as they could and use costly data partitioning schemes. Most of these
kinds of systems are managed in house by the enterprise itself rather than exploiting lower
cost cloud-enabled services. Furthermore, many of these systems have large maintenance
loads imposed on them as a result of internal infrastructural requirements like data and
database management or systems administration. In many cases networks containing
1
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sensitive data are separated from other internal networks to enhance data security at the
expense of productivity, leading to decreased working efficiencies and increased costs.
These kinds of large distributed systems suffer from a lack of stability and reliability as
a direct result of their inflated provisioning and support costs. Simply put, the large cost and
effort burden of these systems precludes the ability to implement the appropriate redundancy
and fault tolerance in any but the absolutely most critical systems [52]. Justifying the costs
associated with standard reliability practices like diverse entry or geographically separated
hot spares is more and more difficult to do unless forced by draconian legal policy or
similarly dire business conditions.
Finally, the length of time between when a sensitive document or other type of data
artifact is requested and when it can be delivered to a requester with acceptable need to
view that artifact is prohibitively long. These kinds of sensitive artifacts, usually maintained
on partitioned networks or systems, require large amounts of review by specially trained
reviewers prior to release to data requesters. In cases where acquisition of this data is under
hard time constraints like sudden market shifts or other unexpected conditional changes this
long review time can result in consequences ranging from financial losses to loss of life.
Federal, military, and healthcare computer systems are prime examples of these kinds
of problematic distributed systems, and demonstrate the difficulty inherent in implementing
new technical solutions. They, like other similar systems, need to be re-imagined to
take advantage of radical market shifts in computational provisioning. New approaches
to networking and information management present possible solutions to these kinds of
problems by providing distributed information-centric approaches to data management and
transfer [3].
Current policy-centric systems are being forced to move to cloud environments and
incorporate much more open systems. Some of these environments will be private or hybrid
cloud systems, where private clouds are infrastructure that is completely run and operated
2
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by a single organization for use and provisioning and hybrid clouds are combinations of
private and public cloud systems. Driven by both cost savings and efficiency requirements,
this migration will result in a loss of direct control of computing resources by involved
organizations as they attempt to exploit economies of scale and utility computing.
Robust usage management will become an even more important issue in these envi-
ronments. Federal organizations poised to benefit from this migration include agencies
like the United States National Security Agency (NSA) and the United States Department
of Defense (DoD), both of whom have large installed bases of compartmentalized and
classified data. The DoD realizes the scope of this effort, understanding that such technical
change must incorporate effectively sharing needed data with other federal agencies, foreign
governments, and international organizations [3]. Likewise, the NSA is focused on using
cloud-centric systems to facilitate information dissemination and sharing [8].
Cloud systems certainly exhibit economic incentives for use, providing cost savings
and flexibility, but they also have distinct disadvantages as well [46]. How to address these
issues is an open research question. Organizations ranging from cloud service providers to
the military are exploring how to engineer solutions to these problems, and to more clearly
understand the trade-offs required between selected system architectures [5]. The problems
themselves are wide ranging, appearing in a variety of different systems. Military and other
government systems are clearly impacted by these kinds of trust and security issues, and
they also have clear information sensitivity problems. This, coupled with the fact that these
organizations have been dealing with these issues in one form or another for decades make
them very well suited for prototypical implementation and study.
This chapter will cover national and international standards in this area, current solutions
in place to address some of these problems, the state of the art in information networks,
and other related work. Organizations have been trying to standardize security approaches
since the 1980’s, starting with the notorious Orange Book [55], and ending with today’s
NIST cloud standards [7]. Information-centric networks are a new approach to information
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management that promises more efficient content management and supplies new capabilities
for information security. The DoD has been key in some of these efforts, and continues
to play such a role today, demonstrated in the state of the art in today’s cross-platform
solutions. The second chapter introduces and analyzes a proposed architectural taxonomy
to address the information sharing goals held by the DoD through the Unified Cross Domain
Management Office (UCDMO), and the third describes in detail the development of this
prototypical system, starting with a single-system proof-of-concept and working through
the current nation-spanning cloud network. The final chapter covers specific experimental
results and analysis of these techniques from a confidentiality, integrity, and availability
perspective.
1.1 Confidentiality and Integrity Models
Current models currently in active use to support information confidentiality and integrity
include the Bell-LaPadula model, the Biba model, the Clark-Wilson model, and the Brewer
and Nash model. Of these, Bell-LaPaudula and Brewer and Nash address information
confidentiality, while Biba and Clark-Wilson address information integrity.
Bell-LaPadula was developed in the 1970’s to address information confidentiality in the
centralized mainframe and minicomputer environments common in military installations
of the day. It is essentially a mathematical state machine model that establishes rules with
respect to how information can flow in stratified environments. It is established around the
Basic Security Theorem, which essentially states that a system with a secure initial state
and only secure transitions is guaranteed to terminate in a secure final state. It extends this
theorem to establish four rules. The first is the simple security rule. The simple security
property prohibits reading information from security levels higher than that occupied by
the reader. The next two are the *-property rule and the strong *-property rule, which
prohibit writing data to any security level less than that of the writer. The final property is
4
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the ds-property, or Discretionary Security Property. The ds-property allows a subject to
pass permissions on to other subject’s at the initial subject’s discretion. This model also
introduces the concepts of dominance relations and tranquility. Dominance relations exist
within partially ordered sets of classification levels, where higher classification levels are
said to dominate lower levels. This means that if a subject is cleared to access top secret
material, that subject can also access secret and confidential material, as both secret and
confidential material is considered to be less sensitive that top secret material. Tranquility
limits object state changes after creation. Essentially, any object is created at a specific
sensitivity level and that sensitivity level does not change with time [20].
The Brewer and Nash model is currently widely used in the financial services industry.
Also referred to as the Chinese Wall Model, this model changes what subjects can access
based on a subject’s context. In this model, information is continually monitored so that no
subject is allowed access to an object that may create a conflict of interest or other moral
hazard. More generally, access to objects is dynamically evaluated based on the context of
a given subject’s previous object accesses. This enforces information confidentiality based
on the context of information access [25].
The Biba model, developed in the late 1970’s, addresses information integrity using
a layered approach similar to that used by Bell-LaPadula, and was in fact developed to
complement Bell-Lapadula’s focus on confidentiality. Bell-LaPadula features a hierarchy
of information sensitivity that guides access decisions. Biba, on the other hand, is based on
a hierarchy of information integrity rather than confidentiality. Biba also has a collection
of specific properties that must be adhered to. The first, the simple integrity axiom, holds
that a subject cannot access an object of a lower integrity level. The second, the *-integrity
axiom, likewise states that a subject cannot write information to higher integrity level. The
third property, the invocation property, states that subjects cannot invoke objects at higher
integrity levels either [22].
David Clark and David Wilson presented their integrity model in 1987 to address
5
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business information integrity as Biba was thought to be more suitable for military use. The
Clark-Wilson model uses five essential components. The first, users, are active subjects
requesting access to objects. The second, transformation procedures, are operations
allowed over objects. These general operations are any that may change the state of an
object, like create, update, and delete operations, as well as simple read access. Systems
are also required to have collections of integrity verification procedures which validate the
state of managed objects. The object themselves have two distinct flavors, constrained
data items and unconstrained data items. Constrained data items are those managed
via trusted transformation procedures and monitored via integrity verification procedures.
Unconstrained items can be directly accessed. Access and management of data items
are constrained by a set of nine rules, divided into sets of certification and integrity rules.
In essence, these rules ensure that all constrained data item access is through trusted
transformation procedures, and that the trusted procedures ensure that information is
maintained in a valid state. Subjects are limited to sets of trusted transformation procedures
expressed by (sub ject, procedure,ob ject) triples, while unconstrained data items can be
accessed without limitation [26].
1.2 National and International Standards
Once the Bell-LaPadula and Biba models were in developed and understood, the DoD
started another effort to more clearly categorize the security of information systems and
related networks. This effort cumulated in what is now known as the Rainbow Series of
books, including the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, known as the Orange
Book, and the Trusted Network Interpretation, or Red Book.
The Orange Book addresses security of individual computer systems. It establishes a
taxonomy of security levels used to classify systems. These levels range from systems with
minimal security characteristics and stretch to formally verified computer systems. These
6
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levels establish such characteristics as separate administrator accounts, role-based security
systems, data labeling, and the recognition of possible covert communications channels
[55].
The Red Book deals with how networks protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information. It addresses encryption, digital signatures, flow protection and
confidentiality, data confidentiality, and infrastructure protection. Like the Orange Book, it
is a framework established over a set of principles to facilitate network security. It discusses
how subjects and objects need to be controlled and accounted for in computer networks
just as they are within individual computer systems [56].
Today, the Rainbow Series has largely been supplanted by the International Organization
for Standardization’s Common Criteria. The Rainbow Series was seen as too rigid, and other
standards too flexible and difficult to implement, leading to the development of the Common
Criteria in 1993. The Common Criteria are based on Rainbow Series, the Canadian Trusted
Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC), and the Information Technology Security
Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC). While the Orange Book examined a system based on a Bell-
LaPadula-centric perspective, the Common Criteria evaluates computing systems based
on a pre-established protection profile, designed to cover a specific security requirement.
The common criteria also use a taxonomy to classify systems. This taxonomy has seven
levels, again ranging from minimally tested systems that have some assured functionality
to formally verified, designed, and tested information systems [31].
Other standards commonly referenced include publications from the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, particularly from their 800-series of special publications.
These publications cover everything from cloud computing security [7] to single computer
systems [1] to web services [4].
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1.3 Current Solutions
The Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) supports efforts to develop
specific solutions to cross-domain information sharing. Solution architectures have been
presented over the past few years to handle this kind of information management. The
National Security Agency set the standard in this area initially. In 2009, at a conference
sponsored by the UCDMO, Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) and Raytheon presented alternative
notional architectures contrasting with current NSA-influenced approaches [41, 6, 24, 44].
The current standard architectural model in place and governed by the UCDMO to deal
with these kinds of issues are guard-centric cross domain architectures. As we will show,
the thinking behind these system architectures has remained relatively static over the past
20 years. New thinking with regard to future internet architectures and usage management
provide more powerful approaches to securing information as it flows through dynamic
systems.
Current and near-future proposed solutions endorsed by the UCDMO include system
architectures assembled by the NSA, Raytheon, and Booz | Allen | Hamilton (BAH). The
NSA has been active in this area for decades as a logical extension of their role in signals
intelligence collection and processing. Raytheon and BAH have been engaged over the past
few years to provide an alternative voice and design approach to these kinds of systems, an
effort met with limited success.
These cross-domain solutions are intended to enable sensitive information to easily flow
both from a higher sensitivity domain to a lower sensitivity domain, and from lower to
higher as well. They generally act over both primary data (say, a document) and metadata
over that primary data.
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Figure 1.1: NSA Legacy Notional Architecture Model
1.3.1 NSA, Filtered
The NSA conducted initial work in this area. Their standard-setting efforts culminated in
a reasonable conceptual system architecture, using groups of filters dedicated to specific
delineated tasks to process sensitive information [41]. In the scenario portrayed in Figure
1.1, Domain A could very well be a private cloud managed by the U.S. Air Force, while
Domain B is a public operational network of some kind shared by coalition partners in a
joint operation.
A system user attempts to send a data package consisting of a primary document and
associated metadata from Domain A to Domain B. At some point, that submission reaches
a guard, which contains at least one filter chain. Each filter chain then contains at least
one filter. Individual filters can execute arbitrary actions over a submitted data package
and have access to any number of external resources as required. At any point, a filter can
examine the data package and reject it, at which point it will frequently wait for human
review. If a filter does not reject a data package, it passes that package onto the next filter
or submits it for delivery to Domain B.
9
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Figure 1.2: NSA Service-Oriented Model
1.3.2 NSA, Services
In recent years, the NSA has extended the legacy system architecture for cross-domain
information sharing to exploit service-oriented computing styles [41]. Visualized in Figure
1.2, this model incorporates more modern conceptual elements and componentry.
Figure 1.2 shows on the left the Global Information Grid, or GIG. On the right, the
Distributed Service-oriented Cross Domain Solution, or DSCDS. The GIG is not a truly
open system — rather, it is a loosely coupled collection of computational services handing
data at a variety of levels of sensitivity, federated to provide stakeholders timely access
to relevant information [6]. The DSCDS is essentially the embodiment of the NSA’s
cross-domain vision applied to service oriented computing. This model fuses various
technology choices with previous cross-domain thinking.
Indicative of this more modern system design thinking, a variety of services and service
consumers are attached to a common service bus within the GIG. Within the DSCDS,
groups of filters are implemented as services inspecting transferred data when moved over
the bus. Finally, all of this interaction is managed by a management interface and controlled
by an orchestration engine accessing a centralized group of policies.
Note that here a common policy repository for various types of security metadata over
primary data elements has begun to be accessed.
10
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Figure 1.3: Ratheon Model
1.3.3 Raytheon
In the past few years, Raytheon has offered a new model for cross domain use influenced
by the NSA service-oriented model [44]. The model in Figure 1.3 is more grounded in the
actual technical environment this kind of solution would be embedded within. The Non-
secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) is one domain, and the Secret Internet
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) is the other. Here, NIPRNet is the lower security
domain (lowside), and SIPRNet the higher security domain (highside). This particular view
shows the motion of data from the high side (SIPRNet) to the low side (NIPRNet).
Here, a data request is submitted from SIPRNet first to the XML Security Gateway
which calls into the Orchestration Engine for policy validation. The Orchestration Engine
then coordinates calls into a Policy Repository as well as to a collection of external Support
Services. Once rectified against these elements, the request is passed into the Cross Domain
Guard which routes the request into the Unclassified Enclave in NIPRNet. Here, the request
is passed directly through the lowside XML Security Gateway, without rectification, onto
the Service Provider. The response from the Service Provider is then passed back to the
requester via the inverse path.
This model also begins to use a centralized policy repository, just as the NSA Service
Model does. It also uses a single cross domain guard to transfer information from both the
11
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Figure 1.4: Booz | Allen | Hamilton Model
highside to the lowside, and vice-versa.
1.3.4 Booz | Allen | Hamilton
BAH submitted a competing model, also in 2009 [24]. In fact, both Raytheon and BAH
presented their models under competitive contract to the UCDMO at the same conference,
so the domain application is not coincidental. Figure 1.4 embodies BAH’s thinking with
respect to cross domain information management. It showcases a Domain A as a high
security domain, and Domain B as a low security domain. Here, dataflow again exists from
the highside to the lowside through the cross domain management system.
While not as detailed as the Raytheon proposal, this does have similar elements. Here,
the data first travels from Domain A into the Interface Segment for Domain A, similar
to the secret enclave used in the Raytheon model. From there, it moves into the CI
Segment, which in turn submits the transferring data into the Filter Segment. From there,
the package is moved into the Interface Segment for Domain B, and then onto Domain B.
The Administrative Segment provides management and oversight of the system as a whole.
Note the absence of specific policy-centric elements. This system is reliant on specific
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policy-agnostic content filters as well.
1.3.5 Current Solution Analysis
These kinds of cross-domain solutions still have clear similarities, and in fact have not
progressed far beyond the initial notions of how these kinds of systems should work. They
still, for example, all use some kind of filter chaining mechanism to evaluate whether a
given data item can be moved from a classified to an unclassified network. Both NSA
models used filters explicitly, as did the BAH model. They all use a single guard as well,
a sole point of security and enforcement, providing perimeter data security, but nothing
else. In each of these current system architectures, users are only allowed to exchange one
type of information per domain. The physical instantiations of these models are locked
by operational policy to a single classification level. Users cannot, for example, have Top
Secret material on a network accredited for Secret material. Finally, these models violate
end-to-end principles in large service network design, centralizing intelligence rather than
pushing that intelligence down to the ends of the system [27].
End-to-end principles are generally considered core to the development of extreme
scale, distributed systems. Essentially, one of the key design decisions with respect to the
early internet was to move any significant processing to system end nodes, keeping the
core of the network fast and simple. Known as the end-to-end principles, this design has
served the internet well, allowing it to scale to sizes unconceived when originally built.
Current cross domain systems are placed at key routing points between sensitive networks.
These locations are core to information transfer between systems and as a result violate the
initial design principles upon which the internet was founded. There does exist some belief
that end-to-end principles need to be modified to support future networks, but nevertheless,
current cross domain systems still violate the basic ideas behind large, scalable networks by
placing complex application-specific logic directly and only in the core of a given sensitive
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network [23].
Future systems will generally demonstrate decentralized policy management capabili-
ties, infrastructural reuse, the ability to integrate with cloud systems, and security in depth.
Policy management will need to be decentralized and integrated within the fabric of the
system. The system is both more secure and resilient as a result, better able to control
information and operate under stressful conditions. Multi-tenancy can lower costs and
increase reliability and is furthermore a common attribute of cloud systems. An appro-
priately secured system facilitates integration of computing resources into multi-tenant
environments. The ability to handle multi-tenant environments and to reliably secure both
data at rest and data in motion leads to computational environments deployable in cloud
systems. Finally, systems must operate under all conditions, including when they are under
attack or compromise and provide protection to sensitive data in depth [50].
1.4 Information-centric Networking
Information-centric networking (ICN) is a new approach to internet-scale networks that
shows promise with respect to decentralized, content-centric usage management, addressing
scale and availability issues with current systems. In general, it takes extensive advantage
of data locality, caches data aggressively, decouples information providers from consumers,
and uses a content-centric perspective in network design. The overriding goals of this
approach include providing higher information availability through better network resilience
and implementing systems that more closely reflect today’s use, focusing on heterogeneous
systems with requirements ranging from mobile to static access [19]. Four of the leading
projects implementing these ideas are Data-Oriented Network Architecture (DONA) [40],
Content-centric Networking (CCN) [16, 12], the Publish-Subscribe Internet Routing Project
(PSIRP) [18], and the Network of Information (NetInf) [17]. In general these projects and
the thinking behind them is motivated by the belief that the current internet is not well suited
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to the way it is used today and that in order to efficiently support future use the internet
needs to be fundamentally re-examined and perhaps, in some ways, re-implemented.
As expected, given that they are trying to solve similar problems and have taken similar
conceptual approaches, the capabilities and features of these projects are similar as well.
To begin with, they all use named data objects as a central abstraction. In this paradigm,
information elements like videos, web pages, databases, and the like are represented by
unique names rather than locations. Current internet systems blur this distinction. Uniform
Resource Locators (URLs) were never designed to be used as content names, for example.
They are content addresses, describing the server and port on which content resides, the
protocol to use to retrieve the content, and the specific location of that content on the
identified server [21]. That said, they are still commonly used to name content, particularly
in caching systems [32] and content distribution networks [42]. The names of these data
objects, since they have unique relationships to content, are tightly bound to the content
they represent. These names need to exhibit strong name-data integrity, so that the name can
be trusted to refer to specific content, and the object retrieved must be verifiably authentic.
They have very similar programming interfaces. These interfaces are built around acquiring
and routing specific data objects from providers to consumers rather than forwarding bits
from one system to another [48, 49]. As a result, operations are oriented more toward
registering interest in a named data object in some way, either through a specific object
request or subscription, and the resulting delivery of that object [19]. ICN systems route
information in similar ways as well, depending on the specific naming topology used as
well. Some ICN systems use name resolution services to bind specific objects to names
[30] while others use direct routing schemes to multiple hosts [33]. Finally, data objects
are frequently cached on devices, both on edge devices and in-network. These caches are
generic and usable by any other services distributed throughout the network [19].
Contrast these design principles with those used to build the current internet. Where
internet-scale networks were originally designed in accordance with end-to-end principles
15
Chapter 1. Introduction
and packetization of information concepts [27, 51], ICNs are build with a much more
data-centric perspective, focusing on routing information rather than just ones and zeros.
This is not a refutation of end-to-end arguments however. Rather, it is an affirmation that
some services must be incorporated into the fabrics of these kinds of systems reflecting the
ubiquitous need for those functions [23].
Though the various different types of ICNs certainly have similarities, they have sig-
nificant differences too. To begin with, they are not all synchronous. PSIRP, for example,
uses asynchronous publish/subscribe style communication between nodes, where requests
and responses can be routed differently. This is very useful for longer-lived sessions on
mobile networks where the content is available at some point in the future, for example.
Furthermore, while most of these systems use the data object as the primary networking
primitive, CCNs do not. Rather, they still use packets. They all use IP as the basic transport
layer technology, but they can use other protocols as well. Names may or may not be
human-readable, and some systems use public-key infrastructures to enforce name-data
integrity [19].
These differences can provide significant advantages. Avoiding public-key cryptography
in data object names allows for human readable names, for example [19]. Allowing network
clients to subscribe to content allows dynamic content to be generated and then routed to a
client at some point in the future. This is still an active area of research where the most
appropriate solutions have yet to be established.
The fact that these systems have independently concluded that future macro-networks
should use a data object as the primary abstraction is significant in that it demonstrates a
widespread belief in the approach. Furthermore, application-level overlay networks have
used this essential approach to content management as well, though not as pervasively as
ICNs [54]. These types of solutions do offer significant advantages and solve many of the
problems currently facing large-scale networks [19]. Timelines for adoption, feasibility
and form of migration, and other important issues have yet to be established at this point.
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With that in mind, commercial organizations have begun to invest research and development
budgets in this kind of work [11, 14].
1.5 Other Related Work
This work introduces the notion of usage management embedded in a delivery network
itself. It also provides an in-depth analysis of the challenges and principles involved in the
design of an open, inter-operable usage management framework that operates over this kind
of environment. Besides referencing the material covered in depth to portray the current
state of the art, the analysis includes application of well-known principles of system design
and standards [23, 27, 28], research developments in the areas of usage control [45, 37],
policy languages design principles [38], digital rights management (DRM) systems [36],
and interoperability [35, 34, 39, 29, 2] towards the development of supporting frameworks.
While a large body of work exists on how overlay networks can use policies for
network management, very little work has been done on using usage policies for content
management. The primary contribution in this area focuses on dividing a given system into
specific security domains which are governed by individual policies [47]. This system fits
into this proposed taxonomy as an α-type system as it has domains with single separating
guards.
A large body of work currently exists with respect to security in and over overlay
networks. These kinds of techniques and this area of study is vital to the production
development and delivery of overlay systems, but is outside the scope of this work.
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1.6 Applying Usage Management
The current state of usage management and control in distributed systems has been ad-
dressed from a variety of perspectives, ranging from the United States government to the
international community. Today, organizations have robust models, international standards,
and technological approaches that can all be brought to bear on their information man-
agement problems. Information-centric networks present an unaddressed opportunity to
bring these standards and theoretical solutions together into a new type of system provid-
ing unique and more powerful information management capabilities. The next chapter
addresses specifically how to migrate these capabilities into information-centric networks
and the characteristics of those networks once they have these capabilities.
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Usage Management in
Information-centric Networks
With the stage set with respect to current technologies and approaches, this chapter will
delve into how to apply these techniques in a network setting. This chapter first addresses
specifically why a content-centered perspective when networking information systems
provides capabilities that are very difficult to address via traditional, packetized networks.
It then covers the characteristics of information networks that protect information, based
on perspectives from industry, government, and the military, describes a taxonomy for
approaching ubiquitous network information management, and then analyzes the proposed
taxonomy.
2.1 Capabilities of Information Networks
When it comes to managing the usage of information resources, information-centric net-
works provide capabilities that traditional packetized networks cannot. The basic structure
of packet networks facilitates simple and efficient data transfer, but is fundamentally based
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on certain design assumptions that render network-centric usage management difficult at
best and impossible at worst [27, 51]. Information-centric networks, taking a very different
approach to network design, are much more amenable to embedded content control based
on their different design principles as discussed in Section 1.4.
Current packet-based systems share three underlying design principles. Strict layering,
in which upper layers only use services that exist in lower layers which in turn have no
knowledge of upper layers, end-to-end arguments governing service placement, and limited
runtime packet sizes. All three of these increase the difficulty in applying control over
information transmitted through networks.
In internet systems, switching and routing traditionally occur in the lower layers of the
OSI model [53]. These decisions are made based on a priori knowledge of a given network
topology, by manual or programmatic configuration [9] and are not impacted by transmitted
content except in very high-end systems [13]. In fact, access to application content occurs
at much higher levels [53]. As a result of strict service layering, the information needed
to make content-sensitive routing decisions is simply not available without breaking layer
encapsulation on these kinds of devices. Granted, Vendors do provide switches that examine
application-level traffic [13]. These intelligent switches are expensive however and as a
result are only feasible for large ISPs to deploy.
End-to-end arguments dictate where services should be placed in a network. Services
like information distribution control that require access to application layer data should,
following these principles, be deployed into the ends of a given network [51]. Admittedly,
this does encourage scalable network design, by keeping the core of a network simple,
efficient, and fast. It however does not support granular information distribution control
based on content rather than topology. In order to control information flow based on
content, internal network nodes must be able to access and evaluate transmitted content.
The fundamental end-to-end principles when applied to this problem would strictly prohibit
that kind of content analysis.
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Likewise, policies associated with content can be arbitrarily large. As a result, they can
exceed maximum packet sizes defined in packetized networks. Furthermore, as content-
sensitive networks must evaluate defined policies prior to routing content, any policy to
be evaluated must be completely downloaded into a router and analyzed for suitability for
transmission prior to any packet routing, leading to inevitable bottlenecks as content is
queued behind the policy elements.
Content analysis of certain kinds of transmitted artifacts may not be possible without
a holistic perspective either. For example, if an XML document is transmitted through a
network, that document may very well have content in element n which is described in
more detail in element n+2. Here, element n and element n+2, by themselves, are not
sensitive. When combined however, they are. When transmitted, these elements would be
in separate packets. For the sake of this argument, assume these packets are built such that
element n is in packet m, and element n+2 is in packet m+ c, where c is some constant,
and that packet m is assembled and transmitted from the source node at some time prior to
packet m+ c. In this scenario, packet m will be passed through an intervening nodes prior
to packet m+ c. Even nodes that maintain a history of transmitted content that may be able
to determine that information in m is sensitive when combined with information in m+ c
will be unable to undo the earlier transmission of packet m. In order to circumvent this
problem, nodes would need to hold packets for some time t to check for context. This may
help solve the problem, as related information likely has some kind of intrinsic locality,
but nevertheless the size of c can be still be relatively arbitrary. As a result, the size of
t is impossible to set a priori. This approach imposes possibly significant performance
penalties as well.
Information-centric networks are based on different primitives, as described in Section
1.4. Specifically, they are based on named data objects with strict name-data integrity, as
well as other associated principles. This different abstraction makes policy evaluation and
content binding simpler, as content can be bound either in-line to policy or via specific
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naming conventions. In these systems, once content is located by name, it is returned to
the requester either via a predefined path mirroring the original request path or a variable
response path. In either case however, all content and associated policy is available at each
routing node in that return path, and can be evaluated for suitability of transmission.
As a result of these fundamentally different underlying models, information-centric
networks in the next-generation internet enable usage management capabilities that are very
problematic to implement and enforce in current internet architectures.
2.2 Characteristics
Examining content at each network node or router point can certainly impact performance
and by extension availability. It is also important to establish that this kind of dynamic
dispatch will actually guarantee delivery along the most secure path needed. With respect
to delivery, it needs to be shown that by selecting optimum paths at given network points
the overall selected path will have the appropriate security characteristics outlined by any
policy associated with delivered content.
To begin with, imagine in a given aggregate path between two points, if local decisions
are made with respect to routing based on specific security criteria at interleaving points,
the path as a whole will adhere to those security criteria. Essentially, this implies that
it is possible to use a greedy algorithm with respect to security and routing and that the
algorithm will yield an optimal security path. It is important to recognize that this is key
to establishing a secure route between two specific points. Furthermore, in a given route,
that route must be viewed temporally as well, in that each link may not be optimal when
the delivered data element reaches a destination, but each link was optimal at the time it
was selected, and by extension, when the aggregate path is reviewed, it would likewise
be optimal with respect to time of traversal. Finally, local nodes may very well have
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knowledge about the local environment that cannot be known by a centralized routing
authority. Allowing local routing decisions with respect to security can help take advantage
of this locality.
The idea behind the proof is if a path P exists consisting of nodes and edges {V,E},
that path was then assembled by choosing the most secure edge e ∈ E from a corresponding
node v ∈V at some time t. The path P consisting of these edges e is then the most secure
path that can be chosen. A proof by contradiction establishes the feasibility of this approach:
1. Assume a path P = {V,E}.
2. Assume that P is not the most secure, and that a more distinctly secure path P′ =
{V,E ′} exists.
3. If P′ exists, then at some v ∈V ∃ e′ ∈ E such that e′ is more secure than the corre-
sponding edge e ∈ E.
4. If so, then at all v ∈V , e′ = e leading to E ′ = E and P′ = P, so P′ is not distinct from
P.
This assumes that a path of some kind does exist. If so, and if the most secure edge
is chosen at each node, the resulting path will in fact be appropriately secure and policy
compliant.
2.3 Taxonomies of Usage Management Overlay
A clear taxonomic organization of potential steps in approaching finer-grained policy based
usage management helps in describing the difficulties inherent in developing potential
solutions as well as aiding in planning system evolution over time. Here, four distinct types
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Name Description
φ The initial level of this taxonomy, φ classified systems
have a single guard without policy-based control
α α classified systems have a single guard by have begun
to integrate policy-based control
β Systems that have begun to integrate policy-based control with
router elements are in the β category
γ Systems that have integrated policy-based control with routing
and computational elements
Table 2.1: Proposed Usage Management Taxonomy
of integrated policy-centric usage management systems have been identified, as shown in
Table 2.1. Of these four, only the first two levels are represented in current system models.
In this taxonomy, it is not required that systems pass through lower levels to reach
higher ones. This taxonomy represents a continuum of integration of usage management
controls. Systems can very well be designed to fit into higher taxonomic categories without
addressing lower categories. That said however, many of the supporting infrastructural
services, like identification management or logging and tracing systems, are common
between multiple levels.
The taxonomy itself starts with the current state, integrating policy evaluation systems
into the network fabric gradually, moving away from filters, adding policy evaluation into
the routing fabric, and finally into the computational nodes.
The UCDMO, described previously, is focused exclusively on promoting controlled
sharing of sensitive information and has specific goals that a clear, realized taxonomy of
granular information-centric usage management helps fulfill. Those goals include an ideal
end state described as a flat network architecture with usage management incorporated
into the distributed system. This is exactly the final γ architecture described within this
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taxonomy [43, 10]. The UCDMO also has specific goals outlined within its founding
charter, including:
• Optimize Capabilities — Drive robust and extensible cross domain capabilities to
support a secure and integrated information enterprise.
• Oversee Resources — Maximize return on cross domain investments, reduce dupli-
cation of effort, and increase efficiency of cross domain activities.
• Mitigate Risk — Support risk-based decisions by enabling global awareness of cross
domain operational connections.
• Provide Leadership — Provide leadership across the inter-agency spectrum to
ensure coordinated cross domain governance, oversight and community reciprocity.
This work certainly contributes to these goals, providing robust cross-domain capabil-
ities, helping mitigate risk, and contributing toward advancing the state of the art in this
kind of multi-level security environment.
2.3.1 φ -level Overlay Systems
The φ classification consists of systems like the initial NSA and BAH notional models.
These systems consist of two distinct domains, separated by a filter-centric single guard.
The initial NSA system model is clearly of this type, separating two domains with a guard
using filter chains. The BAH model is also of this type, using a Filter Segment to evaluate
data packages transmitted between interface segments attached to specific domains.
Generally one of the domains supports more sensitive information than the other, but
that is not always the case. In the models previously examined this has certainly been true,
but classified information for example is commonly stored in compartments which are
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Figure 2.1: Taxonomy (φ )
separated by clear need-to-know policies enforced by access lists and classification guides.
These kinds of compartments contain information at similar levels of classification, but
contain distinct informational elements that should not be combined.
In these kinds of systems, specific rules regarding information transfer and domain
characterization are tightly bound to individual filter implementations. They are based on
a priori knowledge of the domains the guard connects, and therefore are tightly coupled
to those domains. Furthermore, the filter elements are standalone within the system, in
this classification, not availing themselves of external resources. Rather, they examine
information transiting through the filter based purely on the content of that information.
The set of filters that could be developed and deployed within the guard are unlimited.
Developers could easily create a filter that inspects and possibly redacts the sections within
the document, rather than passing or not passing the entire document through the guard.
Indeed, if even very limited processing capabilities are assumed within the guard, that
is, Turing completeness, then this guard can be made as powerful as any solution for
implementing a cross-domain solution (CDS). Thus the computational power of the guard
is not the issue. The real issues are the benefits that can be gained by distributing the
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Figure 2.2: Taxonomy (α)
capabilities intelligently within the networked environment as opposed to fixing them
programmatically and topologically at the perimeter of a sensitive network.
2.3.2 α-level Overlay Systems
The α overlay classification contains systems that have begun to integrate policy-centric
usage management. Both policies and contexts are dynamically delivered to the system.
The dynamic delivery of context and policy allows these kinds of systems more flexibility
with policy evaluation. The α category begins to integrate policy-centric management
rather than using strict content filtering.
Here, two domains exist, Domain A and Domain B, though potentially more could be
implemented. φ type systems require domain specific information to be tightly coupled to
the filter implementations. Separating the permissions, obligations, and other constraints
from the filters and incorporating them into a specific separate policy entity frees the guard
from this coupling and provides additional flexibility to the system.
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The guard can continue to use filters to process data. These filters however are now
more generic and decoupled from the specific domains the guard manages. The choice of
using a specific filtering model rather than some other kind of construct is a design detail
level to implementers. That said however, individual filters will be remarkably different
and still need to understand the ontologies over which specific licenses are defined rather
than specific content semantics.
The policy repository is key to the implementation and differentiation of this taxonomy
category. This repository can be implemented as a separate repository keyed into via a data
artifact’s unique name, for example. It could also represent a policy sent in tandem with a
data artifact in a data package.
The policy repository may be implemented as some kind of external service, and as
such, represents the first such external service explicitly used in this taxonomy. Other
external services may well exist and be used to adjudicate information transfer decisions as
well.
2.3.3 β -level Overlay Systems
The β taxonomic category begins to integrate policy-centric processing with router elements
in a given network. Systems based on this model can also host multiple domains as a
result of flexible policy-based content examination. Each domain hosts a network of some
kind, though that hosted network could very well be a degenerate network of a single
system. Each network hosted in a domain is hierarchical, with specific computational
nodes embodied by workstations, tablet computers or mobile devices, and routing points
embodied by routers or switches of some kind.
Note that usage management has started to penetrate into the routing fabric of the
network by doing content evaluation at router points. Content-based switching networks
have been successful in other domains, and such techniques can be used here to provide
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Figure 2.3: Taxonomy (β )
policy evaluation capabilities [15].
Certain types of traffic are easier to evaluate than others however. For example, HTTP
requests and responses are easier to examine that TCP packets. When examining TCP
packets, systems generally require additional context to select an appropriate packet window
(e.g. the number of packets cached for examination). HTTP traffic does not usually require
this kind of flexibility. Information-centric networks, due to their shift from previous
network models, follow this same kind of pattern and make the information the focus
instead of the transferred bits.
This migration of policy evaluation into the routing fabric provides for enhanced data
security and better network management, especially if part of a network is compromised.
Now that policy decisions can be made at the router level in a given network, network
security in depth is beginning to emerge rather than simple perimeter protection. This not
only provides the ability for additional information protection, but also allows for different
compartments holding information at different need-to-know levels to be created ad-hoc
under different routing segments. In cases of network compromise, this kind of dynamic
policy enforcement can also allow for quick node excision as well.
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Figure 2.4: Taxonomy (γ)
2.3.4 γ-level Overlay Systems
The γ compartment has integrated policy evaluation with compute and routing nodes. Here,
policies can be evaluated against content at all network levels — nodes emitting requests,
nodes fielding requests, and all routing elements in between.
The policy repository is supplying services to all computational elements in both
domains. This gives us increased granularity with respect to data compartmentalization by
integrating information security into each network element. At this point, the network can
create compartments of single nodes, while previously in β level systems compartments
could only be created under specific routing elements. At this level, systems can also
provide services revoking data access based on policy evaluation decisions when needed.
Furthermore, individual node exclusion is possible as well. β classified systems could
excise network elements under specific routers by dynamic policy application. Now, the
same functionality can exist in individual compute nodes. For example, if a networked
device like a smart phone is compromised, that device can be removed from access quickly
or used to supply mis-information.
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2.4 Taxonomic Analysis
The levels of the taxonomy vary primarily with respect to the inclusion of policy-based
usage management and information-centric structure. φ type systems are not structured with
information-centric use in mind, nor do they use policy-centric management. Conversely, γ
type systems are both purely policy oriented and completely information-centric.
As systems move through the levels of the taxonomy they gradually move from one
side of the spectrum to another. Information-centric structures, hierarchical or otherwise,
gradually migrate into the network beginning with β systems. Policy orientation is injected
into the architectures starting with α systems and moving into the network fabric in parallel
with information-centric exploitation.
2.4.1 Characteristics of Policy-centricity
In these systems, policy-based management supplies distinct advantages over filter-centric
information control. This kind of policy-centric usage management is more content specific
than filters, more flexible, and is more expressive than filter-centric systems.
Consider content c impacted by a dynamic context d where d is defined in terms of
the content itself, the person or system requesting that content, and the environment in
which that request is made. Here, only under certain specific environmental conditions
is that requesting agent allowed access to the requested content. Ergo, the decision to
pass the content to the requester is based upon characteristics of the content related to
dynamic changes within the environment. A filter-centric solution contained within the φ
level of the taxonomy is unable to change filter rules based on changes like new content or
environmental alteration as a result of the static nature of the deployed filters. A policy-
based system, on the other hand, is able to express the content specific policy easily for
more dynamic evaluation. This kind of content focus makes implementation of Clark-
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Wilson integrity bounds easier as well. The clear demarcation of data objects simplifies
management of trusted procedures and managed objects [26].
For example, if c contains information that can only be accessed for a specific time
period, a static filter based on evaluating content only cannot determine that the information
in c is no longer appropriate for dissemination after that time period ends. That kind of
evaluation requires meta-data associated with c that specifically describes these time bounds
and a dynamic contextual evaluator able to determine when that window of access has
closed.
Policy-centric systems are more flexible than filter-based counterparts. In a filter-based
solution, the type of content that can be evaluated is tightly coupled to the filters installed.
If a given piece of content is new to a given filter-centric solution, that content cannot be
appropriately examined and must be submitted for human review. A policy-based system is
designed to be more general. When based upon a common ontology, the evaluation system
can be very general with respect to its evaluation of a given policy [37]. A general policy
engine can handle a great variety of different content as long as the policies associated with
that content correspond to known domain ontologies. This generality leads to a greater
amount of flexibility with respect to what can be expressed in a specific policy.
A filter is going to have a specific responsibility, like redacting sensitive words from
a document. In order for that filter to redact those sensitive words, it must have access
to some kind of list of what those sensitive words are. Remember, φ level systems use
static filters, so that filter can only be updated when the filter itself is updated. Now a
policy-centric system on the other hand can have a policy associating sensitivity with
various areas of content in a specific document. In this case, all the system must do is
understand the sensitivity described in the policy associated with the content, and can then
redact that content if needed. The ontology describing the areas of sensitivity will change
more slowly than the content itself, leading to a more flexible maintainable system. This
is of course a simple example solvable by creating a dynamic list; the key point of the
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above example is that the specificity of the filters requires additional complexity in the filter
system itself. The generality of the policy-centric system allows the complexity to be more
clearly expressed and contained within the policy file.
While a filter can process content at specific perimeter points, its lack of reach into
a given network fabric limits the power a given filter can actually have over transmitted
content. A policy associated with content, when transmitted with that content, can reference
much more than the semantics of the protected content. That policy can describe specifically,
in detail, how that content can be used. Filters cannot exercise that level of control.
Assume a distributed system with multiple filter points. In this kind of system, informa-
tion distribution can be controlled via deployed filters at a relatively fine level of granularity.
This kind of distribution control cannot influence the use of protected content however —
once that content is distributed, possessors are accorded full access.
Policy-enabled systems are not limited in this way. Policies, when coupled with policy
evaluation tools, can exercise control not only over distribution and routing, but also over
use of distributed content at endpoints.
These advantages accrue in usage management systems as policy capabilities are propa-
gated through the information-centric fabric. Some of these advantages, like expressiveness,
appear simply by beginning to use policies instead of filters. The remaining two have more
of an impact as additional policy-centric nodes combine to form a system suitable for cloud
deployment, increasing their impact as they move from α to γ types of systems.
2.4.2 Information-centric Structure
Information-centric integration exhibits clear advantages over single point perimeter sys-
tems as well. Specifically, information-centric systems are more partition-able than perime-
ter solutions, enable content throttling, provide capabilities for dynamic content control,
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and allow content to be more traceable.
Administrators typically deploy filter-based perimeter protection at strategic routing
points on secure networks. These kinds of networks are designed with specific regions of
enhanced sensitivity separated by cross domain management systems regulating information
flows [41, 44, 24]. While sensible from the perspective of each protected region as a secure
domain, this design thinking begins to fall apart when exposed to the very real threat of the
malicious insider. Boundary-centric information flow control is impossible to realistically
achieve when the actual boundaries between malicious actors and system users is constantly
in flux. When a malicious actor can be anywhere within a system actual boundaries are
simply too dynamic to be realistically recognized. In order to surmount this fluid system
posture, designers must adopt a security in depth mindset.
Information-centric networks enable this kind of defense in depth via the possibility of
partitioning. An information-centric system can partition the user space and by doing so
decrease the attack surface available to a malicious insider. φ and α level systems based on
perimeter filters cannot do this. Systems beginning at the β level provide the potential to
create need-to-know cells of finer granularity up to γ type systems in which cells can be
created at the level of specific nodes. These need-to-know cells serve to help quarantine
possible intrusion into the sensitive distribution fabric if that fabric is compromised by
helping isolate that system failure within a compromised cell.
For example, assume a hypothetical system with nine nodes connected along a single
data plane within a prototypical secure network. With perimeter defenses, if one of those
nodes is compromised, a malicious actor can potentially begin to monitor communications
traffic between all network nodes, effectively compromising the entire network. In this
same network, if designers partition the system into three cells of three nodes, a similar
intrusion in one of those cells will effectively only compromise that cell, leaving the other
two cells unaffected. This decrease in possible targets for compromise effectively decreased
the network attack surface from any give node by 23 , correspondingly increasing the security
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posture of the system.
Perimeter located filter systems only have the opportunity to control sensitive traffic at
that perimeter boundary. Information located in repositories behind that boundary is not
subject to control if it is retrieved by an agent also ensconced behind that same system
boundary. Granted, control can be exerted at the repository level, but in a system with more
than one repository, this is of limited impact.
A partitioned cell-oriented system, on the other hand, provides greater opportunity for
information monitoring and control. The partitions provide additional potential control
points requests must cross in order to access needed information. Furthermore, less
random cell design provides the capability to unify repositories, providing tight control of
information dissemination.
This hypothetical nine-node system, for example, provides no control over information
dispatched from one of the contained nodes to other contained nodes in its initial design
form. There are no control points within that nine-node network at which to monitor and
control information flow. Partitioning that space into three three-node cells provides at
least one potential control point for all inter-cell requests at which information flow can be
monitored. In cases where a malicious insider is actively collecting and hoarding data for
exfiltration, these additional control points give administrators the ability to automatically
throttle the rate at which sensitive material can be accessed by users to increase the cost of
data collection and increase the likelihood of agent discovery.
Singular perimeter solutions due to their lack of internal control points also forgo
the ability to provide dynamic content control. Once information has traversed a given
perimeter access point, it is no longer under the control of that point and can no longer
be retrieved, accessed, monitored, or modified. Solutions with internal control points can
provide the ability to continually monitor and control disseminated information.
Within a given information-centric system, depending on that system structure, data
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can be more rigorously controlled. β and γ systems provide the ability to dynamically
change information access via contextual changes at a finer grained level than perimeter
solutions. γ systems can in fact provide the ability to retract information access on a per
request basis. This kind of control is especially useful in situations where external partners
may temporarily need access to sensitive information for a specific short period of time,
say during some kind of joint exercise or activity. γ systems can provide that access only
during the window of operation, and retract that access when that window closes. This kind
of use is common in joint military operations with coalition partners.
This kind of dynamic content control can easily implement Brewer and Nash access
control [25]. Access rules in policies can describe the general access to data objects based
on specific individual project context. This project context could then be embodied in
attributes associated with the user to authorize specific actions over objects. In this way,
a subject that has been granted access to information from project A can be dynamically
denied access to content from project B, when projects A and B are mutually exclusive.
The singular location of perimeter filter solutions also precludes easy information
traceability. Data requests within a given network sans internal controls are more difficult
to trace than an information-centric solution with a partitioned cell structure that is tailored
to the specific information requested (say, XML databases or semantic web content). The
partitioned information-centric system requires requests to traverse multiple routing nodes
at which request and response content can be examined and stored for later analysis and
visualization. Perimeter solutions without this kind of structure cannot monitor flows at
this finer-grained level.
The advantages of information-centric systems over single perimeter points gradually
build as information-centricity permeates any given system. Some abilities, like content-
centric access repudiation, can only occur at the γ level. Others, like traceability or throttling,
become more effective as a system architecture traverses from lower to higher levels of
capability within the proposed taxonomy.
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2.5 Experimental Support
As we have shown, information-centric networks provide new ways to secure information,
but the potential costs are still undefined. This kind of repeated content analysis, enabled by
information-centric computation, can potentially delay information delivery unacceptably.
Information integrity can also be damaged using some possible approaches. The specific
impacts on availability and integrity of these increased confidentiality mechanisms are vital
to understand when selecting between multiple options.
For example, removing information from content prior to transmittal over unsecured
network paths certainly protects that removed content, but destroys the integrity of the
transmitted information. Likewise, constant encryption and decryption of data to enable
repeated examination of transmitted content will certainly have a negative performance
impact. The next two chapters describe exactly how the prototype information network is
implemented, and how these approaches impact information confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.
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A key concept in our current work is the separation of content management from physical
communication networks. In the past, content was controlled via partitioning and physical
network access management. Physical networks were tightly controlled as a way to
manage access to sensitive content. Classified networks in common use today are canonical
examples of this kind of approach to content management. Access to these networks
is tightly controlled by classification authorities and the ability to transfer content from
these networks to more open systems is rigorously managed. Corporate systems have also
commonly used this kind of approach, though not usually with so much regulation or rigor.
This kind of approach is not scalable however. It imposes huge costs and infrastructural
requirements that are becoming too large to effectively manage [52]. Furthermore, future
systems containing sensitive information require similar security features, and simply
cannot be developed without custom controlled infrastructure. Health care systems, for
example, have huge security needs and a more finely grained level of application than even
deployed government systems. These systems will contain exabytes of data, all of which
needs to be explicitly controlled, managed, and reviewed by those associated with specific
managed records.
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3.1 Network Implementation Concerns
Separating content networks from physical networks enables network infrastructure virtu-
alization and multi-tenancy. BitTorrent, for example, is a content network optimized for
download efficiency. It run over traditional TCP/IP networks, but manages traffic according
to specialized algorithms unique to BitTorrent. These algorithms take advantage of the
asymmetry between upload and download speeds of typical home-use Internet systems in
which upload speeds are regularly an order of magnitude slower than download speeds. By
partitioning content into distinct sections and downloading them from multiple clients, a
downloading node can effectively use all available download bandwidth and is no longer
necessarily constrained by the upload bandwidth of a serving peer system. These systems
use a similar approach, in that these hypothesized systems also overlay TCP/IP traffic, but
rather than optimizing download speeds they focus on content usage management.
Just as systems like BitTorrent runs over current established protocols, usage man-
agement systems could as well. They support multi-tenant cloud computing systems by
providing secure compartmentalized access to managed information. They also support
the ability to create and use integrated overlay systems between multiple cloud providers,
supporting running of overlay components in systems hosted at Amazon while accessing
nodes executing on Rackspace infrastructure.
Content networks must deal with situations analogous to those encountered in previous
physical systems. Specific examples include cross-domain monitoring and content mashing.
Both problems are currently areas of active research within physical networks and need
extensive examination in information-centric network systems as well.
To begin with, in content-specific networks, cross-domain routing can become an
even more pervasive issue. Currently, cross-domain data processing guards are installed
on the perimeter of sensitive networks where they can monitor and manage outgoing
and incoming traffic. In content networks, these kinds of systems can begin to multiply
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within the information transmission fabric. In physical networks, the network topology is
fixed and is established when the network is installed. After installation, changes in the
essential network topology are cost-prohibitive and correspondingly rare. Information-
centric systems do not suffer from this high cost of change, and can easily morph from one
topology to another. As additional content enclaves appear within a given overlay topology,
the need for content usage management between those enclaves increases.
Mashup scenarios become similarly common. As additional sources of accessible data
appear, opportunities for inappropriate data combinations increase at best geometrically.
Data combinations need to be likewise managed to prevent inappropriate data mixing.
3.2 Initial Prototype Implementation
The first completed prototype shows that overlay routers can in fact use licenses bundled
alongside content to modify transmitted content based on dynamic network conditions.
Running on a single host over HTTP, it simulates two content domains and communication
between them. The communication link has uncertain security state and changes over time.
Note that this prototype currently runs on a single host with varying ports, but it could
easily run on multiple hosts as well. The current single host configuration is simply to
simplify system startup and shutdown.
License bundles are hosted on the filesystem, though they could be hosted in any other
data store. These artifacts are currently XML. They are stored in a directory, and the license
file has a LIC extention while the content file has an XML extension. Both the content and
the license files have the name of the directory in which they reside (for example, if the
directory is named test, the license file is named test.lic and the content file test.xml). In
this context, the directory is the content bundle. The license and content files are simply
documents and port to document-centric storage systems like MongoDB easily. They can
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Figure 3.1: Simulation Logical Configuration
certainly be stored in traditional relational databases as well.
The system itself has two domains, Domain 0 and Domain 1. Each domain consists of a
client node and a content router node. Requests are initially served to client nodes. If client
nodes do not contain the requested content, they the forward that request to their affiliated
content router. The content router will send that request to all the content routers of which
it is aware. Those other routers will then query associated client nodes for content. If the
requested content is in fact found, it will be returned to the original requesting router and
then to the requesting node. If the content is not found, HTTP status 404 codes are returned
to requesting routers and nodes.
All router-to-router content traffic is modified based on security conditions. A Context
Manager maintains metadata regarding network paths. If a given network path is only
cleared for data of a certain sensitivity level, a transmitting router will remove all license
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information and content that is associated with higher sensitivities, and then transmit only
information at an appropriate sensitivity level over the link.
Figure 3.1 shows the prototypical workflow through the system across the domains, and
Figure 3.2 shows the current system configuration of the simulation, with the cross-domain
link highlighted in red. The system is current configured to use ports 4567 through 4571.
All content requests are via HTTP GET. Link status can be changed via HTTP POST
and the CURL command is used to access the network.
This proof-of-concept does implement a simple information-centric network for usage
managed content over HTTP, easily extensible to HTTPS. Changes in the context of the
network dynamically change the format of transmitted content. All source code for this
simulation is publically available on GitHub, at https://github.com/cclamb/overlay-network,
with documentation on how to run the simulation.
Initial results confirmed that the approach was feasible. The network was able to
successfully filter content based on policies and dynamic network conditions. The system
was also able to deliver both arbitrary content and policies within a single document as
well, and it was not prohibitively difficult to extract either data or policies. Furthermore,
Ruby with Sinatra effectively supported the required HTTP-centric infrastructure needed
to effectively simulate an information-centric network. It seemed clear at this point that
extending the prototypical implementation from a single host to a fully distributed network
was feasible.
3.3 Inter-Provider Cloud Configuration
At this point, baseline system images have been created and deployed in both Amazon’s
Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and Rackspace Servers infrastructures. The deployment,
configuration, and logging systems to enable distributed monitoring and centralized re-
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Figure 3.2: Physical Simulation Configuration
porting have all been validated and repeatedly used. Overall, the system currently has 20
nodes running with two distinct providers geographically dispersed across the continental
United States. This leads to a distinct requirement for a centralized system with distributed
access for both initial configuration information as well as logging and auditing. This
required infrastructure has been implemented using Amazon’s Simple Storage Service (S3),
accessible from both Rackspace and Amazon hosted virtual machines.
The specific technical components are Amazon EC2, Amazon Simple Storage Service
(S3), Rackspace Servers, and GitHub. Both EC2 and Rackspace nodes are Ubuntu virtual
machines, albeit at different versions, specifically Ubuntu version 11.04 in Rackspace and
Ubuntu Version 12.04 in Amazon’s infrastructures. These systems are provisioned with Git,
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Category Components
In f rastructure Amazon S3, Amazon EC2, Rackspace Servers
OperatingSystems Ubuntu 11.04, Ubuntu 12.04
Technologies Ruby (Sinatra, Capistrano, YAML)
SupportingSystems Git, Github
Table 3.1: Supporting Components
Ruby, the Ruby Version Manager (RVM), and supporting libraries. They all run as micro-
instances or equivalent, and are bootstrapped with the appropriate project information
to begin to participate as an overlay network node. While EC2 and Rackspace Server
infrastructures are infrastructure-as-a-cloud (IaaS) offerings supporting virtual machine
instances of various types, Amazon S3 is a simple key-value store. Running with REST
semantics over HTTP, S3 stores arbitrary documents associated with specific keys in buckets.
These documents can be downloaded by any authorized participant, where authorization
state is proven by possession of a secret key. In this way, the global configuration of a
specific overlay network can be stored in a single location from which every node can
access information with respect to their pending role and needed configuration information.
Likewise, all overlay network state can also be saved to centralized buckets for later
analysis. Finally, Github is a centralized source code repository used to share code between
all participating nodes. Prior to each content network instantiation, each node checks the
repository for updates, and downloads them if they exist.
All data saved within S3 is serialized in a text-based data serialization language known
as YAML. YAML is a widely supported hierarchical data representation language with
support within the Ruby core platform. This enables us easily serialize Ruby-native data
structures to text-based representations for storage within S3. More importantly, it simplifies
post-experimental data analysis as any information logged to the centralized logging system
during a given experimental run can be easily read and analyzed after the fact.
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Capistrano is used in order to manage and initialize all overlay nodes. Capistrano is
a distributed deployment system initially used to manage large clusters of Ruby-on-Rails
systems. It has since expanded into a general-purpose distributed deployment toolchain,
tightly integrated with Git. This allows us to bootstrap different configurations of networks
from a single command-and-control node simply and efficiently.
3.4 Inter-Cloud Architecture
At this point the system is a distributed content network distributed across multiple nodes
and domains providing cross-domain managed data access. This network consists of clients
accessing information through a user interface subsystem that accesses data from external
sources and a distributed cross-domain information network. Queries are submitted through
a client, to an application server, then to external services and information nodes.
The unique strength of this system is enabling dynamic distributed content control.
This includes information retraction, redaction, protection, and secure routing. Information
retraction involves quickly removing a user’s access to sensitive data. Redaction addresses
simple data removal, while protection would operationally involve applying encryption
layers of increasing strength based on operational demands. Finally, secure routing would
provide the ability to send data over a more secure link if such a link is available and
required.
In this system information retraction involves changing the execution context such that
access for a given user, perhaps even on a specific device, is removed. This context then
propagates through the information network and attached clients. This is useful when a
given user, say a coalition partner, is suddenly considered compromised and can no longer
be allowed access to sensitive information. Likewise, a specific user’s system may likewise
be compromised and be forbidden access to specific information.
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Information redaction is generally used when a user simply does not have authorization
for a specific section of content, generally within a larger document. In these cases, that
information and related policy metadata are simply removed from any query responses.
Likewise, information protection also addresses specific subsections of information in
a larger document, but unlike redaction, a user is in these cases authorized to access
information, but one of the links over which the information must travel is not authorized
to transmit specific sensitive information. In these cases that information can be encrypted
with appropriately strong encryption to allow for more secure information transmission.
Finally, secure routing use directly addresses the ability to select communication links
based on information content. In these situations, a network has more than one path over
which to return content. Furthermore, these multiple paths have different characteristics
providing different levels of service. The system, based on rules contained in a policy and
the current context can then select communication links of different security levels when
returning content.Likewise, the content network must:
• Support and distribute queries for available content based on submitted constraints
including artifact key.
• Support and distribute queries for specific content based on key.
• Evaluate returned content for suitability for transmission to a requesting node at each
transmission step.
• Support partitioning into multiple domains.
• Allow for dynamic information distribution at network start.
• Collect experimental metrics for evaluation.
• Be distributed across multiple nodes.
46
Chapter 3. Experimental Configuration
iPhone
iPad
notebook
application
server node
external
services
Figure 3.3: Overall System Architecture
When in a production configuration, the system consists of an HTML 5 based user
interface subsystem, external data sources, and a content network, as shown in Figure
3.3. The user interface layer displays maps and associated metadata to users based on
submitted geolocation information and supports two different mobile profiles (tablet and
telephone) and a single workstation profile. HTML 5 media queries were used for end
device detection, allowing developers to format information differently for the three profiles
and thereby facilitating usability. External data sources could be any data programming
interface offered by a third party. In this system, Google Maps was used to define, download,
display, and format maps. Finally, this content network exists and is configurable either as
a hierarchical network or a non-hierarchical network containing geo-tagged information at
various sensitivity levels. This content network can be configured arbitrarily, enabling the
creation of a virtually unlimited number of different information domains.
In this work, the client systems layer will be replaced with a command-line interface
and external services will not be accessed, but a typical deployment operationally would
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have these elements.
The user interface subsystem processes requests and returns information from both
Google Maps and the content network based on those requests. Technically, it is based on
the latest version of Ruby on Rails (RoR) using standard RoR configuration conventions
running on top of Ruby 1.9.*. Rake is used for deployment, and Gem for component
installation. Bundler is used to maintain consistent application dependency state and RVM
to manage Ruby virtual machine versions. HTML 5 interface elements are defined using
SASS and HAML.
Operationally, typical system use involves query submission, usage management rectifi-
cation, and result display. Two distinct types of queries exist - an initial query for a map of
a specific location, generally triggered by entering some kind of geolocation parameters
(though potentially using device-generated location information, allowing automatic map
alignment with a user’s current location) and a query for specific sensitive information.
Initial queries have two distinct sub-queries, one of map information directed at the Google
Maps API, and another of the content network to see what data is available. All content
is usage managed to ensure that mashed information is consistent from a data sensitivity
perspective prior to display to the user. Currently, no information is cached within the
interface subsystem.
The content network can be configured to run as an HTTP overlay system using HTTP
routers and nodes or in a peer-to-peer configuration. In either case, queries can be submitted
to the network from any one of the constituent nodes - note that routers do not store data;
rather, they focus solely on routing queries through a hierarchical network. After initial
submission, queries propagate throughout the network based on user-submitted search
parameters. The content network physically runs on nodes provisioned from Rackspace
Cloud and EC2. It is built using Sinatra for HTTP processing and uses Capistrano for
distributed system deployment and control. Distributed data is stored in S3 buckets. RVM,
Gem, and Bundler are used in this system as in the user interface subsystem.
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Figure 3.4: Node Architecture
In both configurations, the common functional flow is built around responding to content
queries with information of appropriate sensitivity for a given query context, as shown in
Figures 3.4 and 3.5. In general, systems are designed with a layered perspective, with an
application layer fielding initial requests, a protocol-agnostic domain layer that manages
query responses, and an infrastructure layer that contains specific required libraries and
other technical artifacts. In these systems, the application layer handles HTTP protocol
issues, translating requests from the lingua franca of HTTP into the domain language
reflected in the domain layer. The infrastructure layer consists of various data management
technologies called upon by the domain layer when needed.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 highlight communication ordering within components in a hier-
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Figure 3.5: Router Architecture
archical content network and also shows the functional components within the system.
From a communication perspective, requests come in through the application layer and are
then handed off for processing to the domain layer. The domain layer retrieves the current
context and is responsible for query dispatch (in the case of a router) or data responses (in
the case of a node) that are managed according to the current environmental context.
The primary components in the router and node systems’ application layer are small
adapters intended to translate between HTTP protocols and domain components. They are:
• Context Manager Client Service (ctx_mgr_s) — This is an adapter between the
domain context manager and the external context service.
• Node Service (node_s) — The node service provides a RESTful interface to external
50
Chapter 3. Experimental Configuration
clients. All content requests are initially sent to a known node service. This is
essentially the external interface to a given content network. A content network
generally contains many distinct nodes as well.
• Router Service (router_s) — The router service is essentially a customized HTTP
router that dispatches content requests and responses through a hierarchical con-
tent network in accordance with established policies and the current environmental
context.
• Dispatch Service (dispatch_s) — This service dispatches information requests to
known nodes based on known policies and context.
The domain layer components include:
• Context Manager (ctx_mgr) — The context manager client service calls into the
context manager service to retrieve the most current contextual information with
respect to the content network, attached clients, users, and devices.
• Node (node) — The node component contains all logic needed to process and respond
to information requests. Nodes manage requests, responses, context evaluation, and
usage management mechanism application.
• Usage Management Mechanism (umm) — The usage management mechanism
will apply rules grouped into policies against a known context to determine the
acceptability of an intended action. It will indicate whether or not that action can
proceed.
• Router (router) — Router domain components manage the distribution of informa-
tion requests and responses, managing information dispersal throughout a content
network in accordance with context and policy.
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• Dispatcher (dispatch) — Dispatchers send requests to known routers or nodes in
the larger context network.
Finally, the sole infrastructure component:
• Information and Policy Repository (repo) — Unique to nodes, information and
policy repositories contain specific content, organized by key, and associated policies.
The same components are used to assemble non-hierarchical networks, in which nodes
have both content and policy storage as well as request response and dispatching responsi-
bilities. Also note that context management and usage management components are shared
between all types of content networks as well as all types of component systems within
those networks. Non-hierarchical nodes and hierarchical routers and nodes all need these
kinds of services.
3.5 Experimental Structure
Content-centric networks are generalized constructs supplying the ability to manage dis-
tributed content more effectively. This work explores specifically how users can control
information security and privacy in a more granular way when data is arbitrarily combined.
In order to do this effectively however, a simple protocol must be defined that allows
connected systems to determine what kind of information is available.
A variety of approaches can be used with respect to information storage in these kinds
of networks. In many ways, they exhibit behavior very similar to filesystems. In a content-
centric network, rather than asking for content via some kind of address, like a uniform
resource locator (URL), a specific non-ambiguous name is used. This is very similar to how
content management systems and web caches work today. These kinds of systems treat a
52
Chapter 3. Experimental Configuration
URL as a name rather than an address, returning a cached image of the requested content
rather than the content actually pointed to by the URL. This requires that consumers and
caching agents recognize and manage the possibility of stale data, but that risk is generally
worth the performance gain. Content-centric networks can similarly optimize various
aspects of content retrieval, returning the most local, highest quality, or most reliable data
item, for example.
In this content network, metadata is associated with specific locations as well as the
locations themselves. Rather than optimizing with regard to location or quality, this network
optimizes security posture. In order to do so, a simple data discovery protocol is in place so
clients can discover what data is available.
Two different models support content access in this kind of network. The first, the Cat
Model, mimics typical filesystem interaction on unix-centric computers. The second, the
Index Model, acts more like a typical website, with a central index providing available
options. Both models are can manage hierarchical content, a requirement for managing
large volumes of information.
The first system is modeled after a typical filesystem. In this case, a user would have
read access to the network via a set of related commands. Filesystems follow a model
where you can list the available contents, access specific details of the contents, and then
access individual content items themselves. In UNIX and unix inspired systems, these
actions correspond to ls, for directory listings, and programs like cat, to allow access to
specific individual content. File details are exposed by options on the ls command.
Command-line access to a content network is certainly feasible. Command-line shells
are common in a variety of environments, ranging from development environments like
Play to software development systems like Ruby and Python.
In the content network, the ls command would traverse the network returning informa-
tion describing contents based on the current security context. This context consists of the
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environment, the resource requested, and the subject requesting the resource. For example,
a user with access to a content network via some kind of shell may list network content
from a device at a given physical and network location and receive content listing A, while
executing a listing from a different device from the same locations may generate content
listing B, which can be significantly different from A based on contextual changes.
Another problem that arises with listing network contents is the fundamentally different
nature of listing a relatively small directory on a local computer as opposed to the contents
of a geographically dispersed network. The latency involved when reading this kind of local
directory is small, and the number of elements to list is tractable. Unbounded networks like
these information-centric networks do not support these kinds of assumptions. The time
required to list the available contents on a dispersed content network can be significant.
A cat-like command on a content network suffers from similar problems. As content
within an artifact can be marked with different sensitivity, displayed artifact content can
change based on context as well. Likewise, large artifacts can take significant time to
display on devices because of content dispersion issues.
The proposed Index Model has significant precedent as well. This model is commonly
used in world-wide-web systems both large and small. Modified versions have been used
to seed BitTorrent networks as well as direct content traffic on early instances of Napster.
Here, a small index file that lists available content on the network. This index could be
associated with a policy and marked for sensitivity, and could contain links to content as
well as metadata describing that content. This index would essentially serve the function
of the ls command in the Cat Model. Selecting a link from an index via a network client
would then serve as the Cat Model’s cat command.
Similar issues with respect to network dispersion exist with showing the contents of
artifacts in both models, and the index contents can seem to change with respect to changing
context, as they are also associated with policy sets describing the use of content. Both
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models can also be optimized for project-centric content viewing or to show indicators with
respect to expected content retrieval latency. Organizationally, any kind of informational
hierarchy within the network would need to be based on the semantics of referenced content
rather than external factors. Content-centric networks use keys to locate content rather than
addresses, so this hierarchical name would in fact be such a key rather than an address for
the content.
Latency effects and content surprise are characteristics of the underlying content network
rather than a specific interface approach. They affect either approach equally. The Cat
Model is more general than the Index Model however. You can in fact implement the Index
Model with the Cat Model, but not the inverse, due to the requirement of an initial index
seed in the Index Model. The index model is however a more logical fit for HTTP networks
like our information network. As a result, the Index Model fits use case needs better than
the more general Cat Model.
3.5.1 Initial Seed Information
An initial index object that contains location information and associated metadata seeds the
network. This information is classed according to sensitivity and consists of names and
latitude/longitude coordinates contained in an XML file, similar to that shown in listing 3.1.
Listing 3.1: Seed Information for the Network
1 <index>
2 <location>
3 <name>The location name; a city name, for example</name>
4 <lat>The location latitude</lat>
5 <lon>The location longitude</lon>
6 <about>Metadata about the location</about>
7 <key>The detail data object name</key>
8 <key>...</key>
9 ....
10 </location>
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11 <location>...</location>
12 <location>...</location>
13 ...
14 </index>
Any of these XML elements can be marked with an attribute, policy-set, which is the
name of a policy set contained in the associated policy file. It is contained as an artifact
with an associated policy set.
Detail data objects are arbitrary XML documents that support the policy attribute. Text,
images, and shape information are all supported. Each different type is ensconced within
an XML element corresponding to the type of data contained, and are delivered in a single
XML document with associated policy sets.
Listing 3.2: Image
1 <artifact>
2 <policy-set>
3 ...
4 </policy-set>
5 <data-object>
6 <image type=".">
7 ...
8 </image>
9 </data-object>
10 ...
11 </artifact>
Listing 3.3: Shape
1 <artifact>
2 <policy-set>
3 ...
4 </policy-set>
5 <data-object>
6 <shape type=".">
7 ...
8 </shape>
9 </data-object>
10 ...
11 </artifact>
Listing 3.4: Content
1 <artifact>
2 <policy-set>
3 ...
4 </policy-set>
5 <data-object>
6 <content type=".">
7 ...
8 </content>
9 </data-object>
10 ...
11 </artifact>
In these examples, data-objects can be associated with policies contained in the policy-
set element. Each policy-set element can contain zero or more policies. Sections within the
content element can also be associated with policy sets, and currently type can be either
xml or txt. A shape can only be associated with a policy set from the shape element itself.
Properties of a shape cannot be associated with a policy set individually. Shape types
include marker, circle, and polygon, as shown in listing 3. Data contained within an image
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element is Base64 encoded and must contain type information to indicate the specific image
format. Currently, the supported values are jpg and png.
Listing 3.5: Marker
1 ...
2 <shape type="marker">
3 <marker>
4 <lat>...</lat>
5 <lon>...</lon>
6 </marker>
7 </shape>
8 ...
Listing 3.6: Circle
1 ...
2 <shape type="circle">
3 <center>
4 <lat>...</lat>
5 <lon>...</lon>
6 </center>
7 </radius>...</radius>
8 </shape>
9 ...
Listing 3.7: Polygon
1 ...
2 <shape type="polygon">
3 <vertex>...</vertex>
4 ...
5 </shape>
6 ...
3.5.2 Policies and Attributes
This system will use attribute based mechanisms for usage management. The policies
defined over content must therefore consist of rules that address usage over an ontology of
possible user attributes of concern. Of specific interest is a user’s primary attributes: mission
affiliation, clearance levels (both sensitivity and category), organization, and computational
environment (consisting of both device and operating system).
Sets differ from orderings in the Table 3.2 as sets denote membership with no associated
value. Orderings on the other hand have distinct values increasing from left to right in
the listed enumerations. For example, a user can be affiliated with a specific mission in
Domain A, either tropic_thunder or gallant_entry, or both. That user is also associated with
a sensitivity value, either unclassified, secret, or top_secret, where top_secret is the most
sensitive and unclassified the least.
Need-to-use decisions are based on the current context in tandem with mission and
organizational affiliation. Attribute based control is used in these scenarios, in which access
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Dimension Type Required? Domain A Domain B Domain C
Affiliation Set Yes tropic_thunder, tropic_thunder, tropic_thunder,
gallant_entry gallant_entry curious_response
Sensitivity Ordering Yes unclassified, unclassified unclassified,
secret, secret, secret,
top_secret top_secret top_secret
Category Set No aqua, alpha, one,
magenta, beta, two,
vermillion gamma three
Organization Set Yes Oceania, Oceania, Oceania,
Eastasia, Eastasia, Eastasia,
Urasia Urasia Urasia
Device Set No workstation, workstation, workstation,
tablet, phone tablet
phone
Table 3.2: All Possible Attributes for Usage Management Decisions
decisions are made based on the attributes of a requesting user rather than defined roles.
User attributes support defined policy elements. Not every policy attribute has a
corresponding user attribute as not all policy attributes are associated with users. Some are
associated with the user’s environment, like operating system or device.
Policies are evaluated either via direct set membership or via membership in a category
in an ordering. Content can be affiliated with multiple sets with regard to set-oriented
attributes. Likewise, users can belong to multiple sets as well. Both content and users
will be associated with a single value from an ordering element, as that value dominates
lower values as well. For example, a user can be affiliated with both the tropic_thunder and
gallant_entry missions, but only one of the clearance values of uncleared, secret, or top
secret. In the case of clearance values, secret subsumes uncleared, so a user with a secret
attribute set would be able to access any unclassified material.
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Dimension Type Required? Domain A Domain B Domain C
Affiliation Set Yes tropic_thunder, tropic_thunder, tropic_thunder,
gallant_entry gallant_entry curious_response
Clearance Ordering Yes unclassified, unclassified unclassified,
secret, secret, secret,
top_secret top_secret top_secret
Category Set No aqua, alpha, one,
magenta, beta, two,
vermillion gamma three
Organization Set Yes Oceania, Oceania, Oceania,
Eastasia, Eastasia, Eastasia,
Urasia Urasia Urasia
Table 3.3: Possible Attributes for Usage Management Decisions Specific to Users
In the scope of this project, a Ruby-based domain specific language (DSL) is used
to describe policies. In larger heterogeneous deployments, a standards-based alternative
like XACML would be more suitable. This project however is not focused on developing
a complete policy specification language, but rather on using one in a very dynamic
environment. XACML, for example, is a very large and complete standard that would
require a significant investment of effort to implement. It can also tend to be verbose. A
simple DSL focused on specific needs is a more efficient alternative that allows designers
to focus time and effort on the goals of this work rather than implementation of a large
standard.
Listing 3.8: Policy DSL Example
1 policy_set {
2 policy(:p1) {
3 match :all
4 rule(:mission_affiliation) { |x| x == :tropic_thunder }
5 rule(:sensitivity) { |x| x == :top_secret }
6 }
7
8 policy(:p2) {
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9 include :p1
10 match :all
11 rule(:device) { |d| d == :workstation || d == :phone }
12 }
13
14 policy(:p3) {
15 include :p1
16 match :one
17 rule(:category) { |c| c == :vermillion }
18 rule(:organization} { |o| == :oceania }
19 }
20 }
This is the simplified DSL supporting a subset of XACML elements. In this example,
a base policy exists, p1, that all other policies inherit. That policy requires that all rules
evaluate to true. p2 adds another rule based on devices, all of which must evaluate to true
as well. Finally, p3 adds two additional rules, only one of which must evaluate to true for
the policy to be fulfilled.
3.6 Primary Interfaces and Mappings
Each of the defined components have an associated interface defined over domain datatypes.
These interfaces are implemented using Representational State Transfer (REST) semantics
over Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and the datatypes are represented in Extensible
Markup Language (XML).
Listing 3.9: Key Artifact Dataypes
1 typedef policy_set string;
2 typedef artifact string;
3
4 struct artifact_descriptor {
5 policy_set policy_set;
6 artifact artifact;
7 };
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8
9 typedef sequence<artifact_descriptor> artifact_descriptor_list;
As shown in Listing 3.9, the system primarily deals with two key datatypes, artifacts
and policy_sets. For the purpose of networked data transfer, both of these datatypes are
formatted strings of XML and policy DSL data. An artifact_descriptor combines an artifact
with its associated set of policies. An artifact_descriptor_list is an unlimited sequence of
artifact_descriptors.
Listing 3.10: Key Status Dataypes
1 enum status { unsecured, confidential, secret, top_secret };
2
3 struct link_status {
4 string name;
5 status status;
6 };
7
8 typedef sequence<link_status> link_status_list;
9
10 struct context {
11 date date;
12 link_status_list network_Status;
13 };
Network status information is contained in status elements and grouped into a context
structure, as shown in Listing 3.10. A status_list is essentially a dictionary of network
connection statuses organized by link name, where an edge is named by concatenating the
edge nodes in any order. These node names are concatenated and separated by a pipe symbol,
so that the edge between NodeA and NodeB is named NodeA|NodeB or NodeB|NodeA. This
makes searching less efficient, in that a Context can contain a status_list with names in
either ordering, in exchange for easier and more terse data exchange.
Listing 3.11: Key Error Dataypes
1 exception error {
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2 string message;
3 };
4
5 exception client_error : error {};
6 exception server_error : error {};
7 exception unknown_response_error : error {};
Finally, shown in Listing 3.11, the error exception is represented by standard HTTP
error codes and responses operationally, and is used extensively throughout system interface
operations. Other information can be included in exception messages if the errors are not
HTTP specific.
The artifact_manager interface is described in Listing 3.12. This interface is mapped to
a REST style request over HTTP where the argument ordering is preserved when building
the URL for accessing artifact content. For example, when accessing a specific artifact, the
artifact operation called with a username of ’truchas’, on an iphone, for artifact X1234 would
map to the URL http://host/artifact/truchas/iphone/X1234. Likewise, a similar operation
call on the artifacts operation would use the URL http://host/artifacts/truchas/iphone. Both
Nodes and Routers implement the artifact_manager interface.
Listing 3.12: The Node Interface
1 typedef string user_name;
2 typedef user_name subject;
3 typedef string key;
4
5 enum device { tablet, phone, workstation };
6
7 interface artifact_manager {
8 artifact_descriptor get_artifact(in subject s, in device d, in key k) raises (error)
;
9 artifact_descriptor_list get_all_artifacts(in subject s, in device d) raises (error)
;
10 };
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This type of calling convention is used throughout the system. The specific ordering of
the URL elements stems from corresponding artifact set relationships. Specifically, the set
of all artifacts a user has access to is the same as or larger than the set of all artifacts that a
user on a specific device can access and is also the same size or smaller that the set of all
available artifacts.
Listing 3.13: The Context Manager Interface
1 interface ContextManager {
2 context context() raises (NetworkError);
3 };
The ContextManager interface defined in Listing 3.13 describes how the network
context monitor exposes network state information to requesters. Note, in this case, the
defined interface maps to the URL http://host/context.
The usage_management_mechanism makes decisions with respect to proposed activities
based on a set of policies and the current dynamic environmental context.
Listing 3.14: The Usage Management Mechanism Interface
1 enum activity { transmit };
2 typedef string policy;
3
4 [Constructor(in ContextManager contextManager);]
5 interface usage_management_mechanism {
6 bool can_execute(in policy p, in context c, in activity a);
7 };
The repository interface shown in listing 3.15 defines how information is stored and
retrieved within a given node or router. This is an internal component used for concrete
data item storage.
Listing 3.15: The Repository Interface
1 interface repository {
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2 artifact_descriptor get_artifact(in key k);
3 artifact_descriptor_list get_all_artifacts();
4 };
Finally, the dispacher interface, also used internally within a given node or router,
describes how requests are passed to other network participants.
Listing 3.16: The Dispatcher Interface
1 [Constructor(in string host);]
2 interface dispatcher {
3 artifact_descriptor_list dispatch(in user u, in device d, in key k) raises (error);
4 };
3.7 Using the Network
This system is now defined, with primary interface and data type definitions, and imple-
mented. At this point, it can filter information through defined nodes implementing different
strategies in accordance with specific defined rules. It is also instrumented so that it can
generate accurate timing information needed to measure availability impacts of confiden-
tiality strategies on transmitted information. The next chapter will cover specifically how
these results were collected, the results themselves, and interpretation of what those results
imply.
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Experiments using this inter-cloud framework yield promising support for this approach.
They show only a slight degradation of information availability as a result of this network
permeated security approach, with redaction and encryption demonstrating the smallest
degradation at a higher impact on delivered information integrity. Rerouting-based ap-
proaches have the most performance degradation. Encryption generally has the smallest
impact on information integrity. This is most evident when network effects are removed
from evaluation. Non-hierarchical and hierarchical networks have very similar go perfor-
mance with respect to content availability as well.
The goal of this experimental work was to characterize confidentiality, integrity, and
availability impacts of these information-centric network security approaches in both hierar-
chical and non-hierarchical configurations. The specific strategies addressed were redaction,
rerouting, and protection (via encryption), and these strategies were evaluated from the per-
spective of confidentiality, integrity, and availability over hierarchical and non-hierarchical
networks, and on standalone nodes. Confidentiality was measured via the control used
to protect information. Removing information entirely provided the highest measure of
protection but is akin to unplugging a computer to improve its cyber-security posture.
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Routing information through a more secure channel is the next most powerful approach,
followed by sensitive information protection via strong encryption. A 256-bit AES-CBC
encryption scheme was used in this work. Availability was measured by the delivery of
information and the time required to ensure information delivery, measured by end-to-end
network performance. Integrity is a function of the alterations to the information required
for secure delivery in the tested scenario. Unaltered information has the highest integrity,
followed by information that is still complete but protected via encryption, information
that has been divided and rerouted, and finally information that has had content redacted.
Though combinations of strategies in a given network can be specified, as strategies are
specified by network node, in these experiments only a single strategy in each network
was used to more clearly attribute strategy performance impacts. Identical policies were
used in each simulation to ensure the same amount of required usage management actions,
limiting the effects on availability to the approach rather than differing policy. In each case,
a control simulation that did not incorporate any usage management was run to provide a
performance baseline.
4.1 Hierarchical Networks
In these tests, a simulated γ-categorized system was examined. This is the kind of system
that organizations like the UCDMO have identified as the final goal state of their work,
systems that incorporate policy-centric management in the fabric of systems and networks
(12). The kind of components required to do this kind of policy-based content-sensitive
evaluation do not currently exist, and components of these kinds of systems are only now
beginning to emerge. Systems like OpenFlow, when they have stronger hardware support,
can begin to provide some of these kinds of capabilities. OpenFlow enabled systems are
not yet common or widely used however, and though they do provide the needed control for
these kinds of systems, the do not supply the necessary policy interpretation and evaluation.
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As a result, this experimental work was conducted over an HTTP overlay network, at the
application layer. Using a document-focused protocol makes content evaluation simpler as
well, as systems can evaluate all content when it transits a network rather than maintaining
a buffer of content required when processing packet-level communications.
In order to develop a stronger perspective on the network performance, delivery times
were measured from three separate nodes. One node is hosted in Comcast’s infrastructure
(a large local internet service provider), one at Amazon, and another at Rackspace. The
tested network had four levels. The first level had a single router node. The next level had
two routers, both connected to the router in the first level. The third level contained four
routers, two attached to each of the routers at the level just above. Finally, the fourth level
contained nodes, distributed so that two level three routers had three nodes, one level three
router had two nodes, and the last level three router had four nodes. The first three levels
were essentially a binary tree. The network was queried from five different locations. The
node that contains the content was queried directly (the home node). A node under the
same router as the home node was then queried for content (the peer node). Next, queries
were sent to a node under a different router, but connected to the same second level router
(the neighbor node). Finally, two nodes on the other side of the network were queried for
content (the distant (1) and (2) nodes). Each node was queried for content 50 times in each
strategy, for a total of 200 queries per node. Each figure is the result of 1000 individual
sample measurements collected throughout the day and throughout the week.
Figure 4.1 shows performance results from the Amazon testing node. The access times
for the content from the home, peer, and neighbor nodes were by far the smallest. As the
testing node was hosted in the same datacenter as these three nodes, that was to be expected.
The access times for both distant nodes was, however, surprisingly high. With that in mind,
the overall trend for response times is sensible however, with access time increasing as the
requesting node is farther away from the content in the information network. Queries from
distant nodes need to traverse five information routers, while home, peer, and neighbor
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Figure 4.1: Hierarchical Results from Amazon
nodes only traverse one, two and three, respectively. Also surprising was the finding that
rerouting was generally more expensive from an availability perspective than encryption-
based approaches. This is likely attributable to the costs associated with attaching to the
external SMTP server, hosted at Google, used as the out-of-band communications channel.
Also evident is remarkable performance variability. Specifically, results from the Distant (1)
node show remarkable variance. Variance also seems to increase in this group of samples
as requests move farther away from the home node. Control data was collected at different
times than experimental data, and infrastructural demands seem to have driven the control
data availability to be less than that of other, managed approaches. Overall, this evidence of
variable performance due to external provider demands leads to the conclusion that overall,
the availability costs of the various approaches are in fact negligible.
Figure 4.2 shows similar results to Figure 4.1. Here, the query times are much higher
for the home and peer nodes, but actually lower for the distant nodes. In this case, the
content is still hosted in Amazon’s infrastructure, but the testing node is at Rackspace.
As a result, the longer response time for content from the home node is to be expected.
Queries to distant nodes are actually shorter than the previous calls into distant nodes from
Amazon. This stems from the fact that the distant nodes are both hosted at Rackspace. This
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Figure 4.2: Hierarchical Results from Rackspace
locality shortens the round trip distance for a request. Previously, from Amazon, a content
request would need to travel from Amazon’s east coast data centers to the Rackspace data
center in Dallas, then back to the east coast for content, then back to Dallas, then back to
the east coast. In this test, the request only travels from Dallas to the east cost, and back.
Nevertheless, the overall performance profile is sensible, reflecting the expected shorter
latency between home, peer, and neighbor nodes when compared to distant nodes. Similar
to amazon, cases when the control latency is higher than experimental latency emerge,
indicating some amount of infrastructure performance variability. In Figure 4.2 however, it
is evident that overall encryption and rerouting impact performance more than redacting, as
would be expected. Rerouting again has high overall impact, likely as a result of contacting
Google’s remote SMTP services.
Rackspace results also seem to exhibit less variance than equivalent results when testing
from Amazon, as shown by the standard deviations in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Rackspace
results are dominated by routing and encryption variance as well, indicating variance as
a result of system node performance rather than network effects. Network effects would
touch on all results more uniformly, as shown in Figure 4.1. Processing induced variance
would preferentially effect those strategies that require more processing, like encryption
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and rerouting. This is the pattern seen in Rackspace testing.
Figure 4.3 Shows performance results measured from Comcast. Interestingly, they
show significant variability when accessing nodes hosted at Amazon, and more predictable
performance when accessing nodes in Rackspace’s infrastructure. The overall variability
does not follow the expected pattern of shorter response times when accessing content from
nodes close to that content, except in a few cases. This illustrates the kind of performance
variability one can expect from an external service provider. Interestingly, the variance of
performance in Comcast testing is somewhat low, except for a single spike in the control
case resulting from a single unusually slow response.
Integrity impacts are the result of approach rather than platform. Redacting content
destroys information integrity, as information is removed and not delivered to requesters.
Encryption maintains integrity the best of the three alternatives as information, even though
encrypted, is still delivered, and delivered in the context of the query response at that.
Rerouting is better than redaction, in that sensitive information is still delivered, but worse
than encryption, as it is not delivered within the response context and is sent out-of-band.
Simulations removed sensitive information from the information network and dispatched
it to a user’s email address via SMTP over TLS when the selected strategy was rerouting.
This impacts information availability, as email delivery times can be highly variable. In
these experiments, delivery could take anything from a few seconds to a few minutes.
Confidentiality is likewise impacted primarily by approach and not by infrastructure.
Redacting sensitive content provides the best confidentiality protection, as sensitive content
is simply not exposed. Encryption is likely the worst solution from a confidentiality
perspective as content encryption is a delaying tactic against a determined, well-resourced
adversary. Rerouting may be better or worse than encryption as an approach, depending
on the confidentiality of the out-of-band channel. If the security of that channel can
be guaranteed, then it is likely a better approach. If, on the other hand, the security of
that channel is more variable or difficult to ascertain, encryption may be a more reliable
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Figure 4.3: Hierarchical Results from Comcast
approach.
Overall, results show that, from a performance perspective, the rerouting approach fares
the worst, but only slightly, and certainly not in all cases. Both results from Amazon and
Rackspace, in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, show encryption as generally taking the second largest
performance hit, just following rerouting. Furthermore, network effects have a much larger
impact on performance than information protection approaches. The query to the home
node is an excellent predictor of overall network stability, as content delivered directly
from a home node is only subjected to the selected information protection strategy once.
Note that when queried from Amazon or Rackspace, the home node timing results are very
close to uniform. Queries from Comcast, however, are much more varied, indicating more
highly variable quality of service within the Comcast network. This is also supported by
the gross distribution of response times. Within both the Amazon and Rackspace networks,
the farther a queried node is from the content requested, the worse the latency, as expected.
Comcast’s network has a much more uniform information network response time overall as
the processing time of the information network simulation is overshadowed by the highly
varied performance of Comcast’s physical network. Availability is surprisingly uniform
across all confidentiality strategies, showing little impact on end-to-end processing times.
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4.2 Non-Hierarchical Networks
In order to test non-hierarchical networks, a simple branching network of participants was
used, identical in form to the hierarchical network, though queries could be routed through
the network from any point. Queries could come into any node on the network, and would
propagate through the network to the requested content, evaluating the returned content as
it passes back through the network in response to the initial query.
In these experiments, the node that contains the content was queried, then the node
immediately next to that content node, and so on, to a distance of five nodes. The home
node again contains content, and the additional nodes are marked by the distance in node
count from the home node, starting with Neighbor (1), proceeding through Neighbor (5).
The non-hierarchical network was queried from Rackspace, Amazon, and Comcast, for a
total of 200 queries per individual node, testing the system 50 times per each confidentiality
strategy. Here, each figure is the result of 1200 individual sample measurements, again
collected throughout the day and throughout the week.
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Figure 4.4: Non-Hierarchical Results from Amazon
Figure 4.4 shows the performance of a non-hierarchical network as tested from the
Amazon test node. The content response latency is characteristic of moving farther from the
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source node through the network. The request nodes switch from Amazon infrastructure
to Rackspace infrastructure starting with Neighbor (3), and this is reflected in the sudden
increase in latency. As the tests originate from Amazon, at the Neighbor (3) node, a request
and it’s response must travel from Virginia to Texas, then back to Virginia, then back to
Texas, then back to the original requester in Virginia. The spike in latency at Neighbor (3)
when re-routing traffic is caused by SMTP delays with systems hosted at Google. Overall,
the distribution is very similar to the hierarchical case. Also evident is a continuation of the
previous pattern in which re-routing is the least efficient strategy, followed by encryption,
then redaction.
Variance is generally low overall, with spikes associated with rerouting in the Neighbor
(3) and (4) cases. These spikes are associated with small groups of slow responses, where
those responses are taking up to an order of magnitude more time to return than other, more
typical samples. This performance variability certainly effects the mean response times
negatively, but even in samples with low variance, rerouting does perform the worst of the
measured strategies.
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Figure 4.5: Non-Hierarchical Results from Rackspace
Unlike the previous Amazon-based tests, the Rackspace tests shown in Figure 4.5
latencies seem much more uniform. This again stems from the fact that each content query
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will always traverse the distance between Amazon and Rackspace data centers at least once.
Other than that, the distribution again shows an increase in measured latency as the queried
node moves farther and farther away from the home node. Once again, a dramatic spike in
latency associated with high performance variance emerges based on SMTP delays when
rerouting information. The pattern of rerouting having the highest latency continues here as
well. The dramatic variance in rerouting performance associated with the Neighbor (1) and
(4) nodes results from small groups of samples with significantly degraded performance.
Even with this in mind, rerouting still performs the worst.
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Figure 4.6: Non-Hierarchical Results from Comcast
Results from Comcast, included in Figure 4.6, shows a fairly regular distribution of
response latencies overall. In this case, the test node is ensconced within Comcast’s network
infrastructure. Generally, re-routing is the least efficient approach, but not uniformly. In
this case, network effects created by the physical location of the testing node dominate
these results. We again have latency variance associated with rerouting resulting from a
single sample with significantly degraded performance.
Non-hierarchical networks behave very similarly to hierarchical networks. This is not
surprising — although the nodes are more functionally complex, performing routing and
repository functions, once the content is found and delivered the roles the nodes fall into
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mirror those in a hierarchical network. For example, in a typical query, a node will receive
a request, check the repository for the requested content, and if the content does not exist,
pass the request onto the next known nodes. This does differ slightly from the hierarchical
case in that the nodes check for content at each routing step, though this is a very fast and
simple test. Once content is found, the response is routed back the the requester without
any repository checks, just as it would be in a hierarchical system.
4.3 Removing Network Effects
Having established the parameters under which confidentiality strategies may be chosen,
the next immediate area of concern involves the number of filtering events that can occur
prior to a given information network suffering from degraded performance. Previous results
demonstrated that some kind of degradation of performance in the selected network based
on distance from content does exist, but that can also be attributed to the distributed nature
of the network itself. Processing performance of a given node must be evaluated free of
network effects in order to more clearly understand the availability implications of content
filtering itself.
A single node, configured on one of the test nodes in either infrastructure, would
yield the type of network effect free performance limits needed. A node in Amazon’s
environments was configured such that requests were made of the home node itself, under
each of the three confidentiality strategies. Requests were also directed to the home node
without any usage management systems engaged in order to collect control data. After that
initial request, the node was configured with various usage management strategies in order
to measure their availability impact.
As shown in Figure 4.7, with information network effects removed, redaction and
encryption have very similar performance overall. Redaction, as a strategy, is very simple
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Figure 4.7: Non-Hierarchical Results from Rackspace
programmatically, and as symmetric encryption is used for information protection, ciphering
and deciphering operations are very fast. Rerouting, in this case, is clearly the worst
strategy. This is a result of the dependency of this strategy on external systems and system
configuration times. Specifically, configuring and using SMTP for each rerouting operation
is prohibitively expensive. Rerouting as a strategy has intrinsic external dependencies,
unlike other strategies measured. This results in significantly variable performance of
sample response times. Single samples and small groups of samples exhibit significantly
degraded performance in the collected experimental data, creating high standard deviation.
These significant outlier effects happen frequently enough to be a feature of the strategy
rather than isolated events.
4.4 Conclusions
The work described herein presents bounds under which to select specific confidentiality
strategies for protecting information in content networks. The state of the art of this kind of
information protection in content networks was first described, and the current accepted
protection architectures sponsored by the UCDMO were introduced. A related taxonomy
of increasing information protection was then presented, describing their advantages and
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disadvantages and how they could be implemented. Next, the current customizable ex-
perimental framework for evaluating various confidentiality strategies was described. A
description of and the motivation for the experiments over these networks, the results of
these experiments, and analysis of those results closed the dissertation. All simulation code
is freely available via Github.
Overall, confidentiality strategy had little impact on information availability. Redaction,
rerouting, and encryption all performed within similar bounds. Of these three approaches,
redaction damaged information integrity the most, followed by rerouting, and then encryp-
tion, depending on the security of rerouting infrastructure. Redaction provided the most
confidentiality, followed by rerouting, and then by encryption (as encrypted content is gen-
erally at best a delaying tactic given enough time for cryptanalysis). Based on these results,
rerouting is likely the best general solution, depending on the existence and reliability of a
secondary secure channel. Less sensitive information can still be delivered via encryption,
especially if that information is only sensitive within a given time window. Very sensitive
information can be redacted, but due to the related damage to integrity, this is only an
attractive option when confidentiality is of the utmost importance. In most cases however,
even if rerouting may be an attractive solution, the cost of establishing a secondary trusted
infrastructure in tandem with the time-sensitivity of the value of information and the ease
of encryption based approaches may very well lead to encryption approaches being more
popular.
Non-hierarchical and hierarchical networks performed similarly. There was no signifi-
cant difference in availability between networks with respect to confidentiality strategies.
Different network topologies certainly have different characteristics with respect to reliabil-
ity as a result of selected architectures however, specifically with respect to the centralization
or decentralization of key functions, but that analysis is outside the scope of this work.
Table 4.1 shows the overall results of experiments and analysis with respect to various
possible approaches to securing information transiting content networks, on a scale of one
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Property Redaction Rerouting Encryption
Confidentiality 3 2 1
Integrity 0 1 3
Availability 3 1 2
Table 4.1: Approach Evaluation Summary
to three, with three the highest and one the lowest scores. Not surprisingly, there is no clear
best approach. Rather, decisions with respect to which approach to choose for given content
is highly dependent on the sensitivity of the content as well as integrity and availability
requirements.
At this point, the information network implementation has integrated three different
configurable strategies for information protection, and routes information via an overlay
network using HTTP. Longer term, this project will expand to both incorporate public-
key encryption protocols and software defined networking (SDN) capabilities to provide
physical control of information routing. Public-key encryption capabilities via an integrated
public key infrastructure providing additional privacy and non-repudiation abilities for the
network and SDN capabilities via integration with OpenFlow will be investigated. Shorter
term goals include inclusion of different modes of operation, so that the network can
support both request/response and publish/subscribe modes of operation, and more robust
development so the system can run as a commercial grade security-on-demand service.
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